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IV 
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASI: 
Nature of the Case 
A jury found Dennis James Garner guilty of battery on. and propelling bodily fluids at, a 
detention deputy as he was being booked into jail Mr. Gamer's theory of the case was that, to 
the extent he committed a battery, he \\as merely defending himself against the detention 
deputies' unreasonable use of force. But the court refused to instruct the jury accordingly 
because it did not believe there is a right to post-arrest self-defense. This appeal raises an 
apparent issue of first impression in Idaho: Whether an arrestee who is being booked into jail 
has a right to defend himself against a detention officer's unreasonable use of force. The answer 
to that question is "yes." The right to self-defense. conferred without qualification by the Idaho 
Constitution and the common law, if not the U.S. Constitution, does not evaporate after the 
individual acting in self-defense is arrested. Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized 
that the U.S. Constitution protects an individual's right to he free from an officer's use of 
unreasonable force, regardless of his status as an arrestee, pretrial detainee. or inmate. Finally, 
an arrestee should not have to choose betwei:n suffering serious injury or death on the one hand, 
and earning a felony conviction and prison term on the other. This Court should therefore 
recognize an arrestee's right to use reasonable force to defend himself against an officer's use of 
unreasonable force during the booking process. vacate Mr. Garner's battery conviction, and 
remand his case to the district court for a new trial on that charge. 1 
1 Mr. Gamer does not challenge his conviction for propelling bodily fluids. 
I 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On May 14. 2014. the Boise Police arrested Mr. Garner for public intoxication. 
(Tr. Vol. I,2 p.20, Ls.I I 16; PSI, p.13.) As he was being booked into the Ada County Jail, 
Mr. Garner allegedly kicked and spat at a detention deputy. (PSI, pp.20-24.) When the kicking 
took place, four officers held Mr. Garner. who was handcuffed, face-dov,n on the ground. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.284, Ls.19-22: Tr. Vol. II, p.28, Ls.13-14 ). Mr. Garner kicked out of the leg-lock 
that one of the deputies had him in, and in turn allegedly kicked that deputy. (Tr. Vol. I, p.360, 
Ls.10-12; Vol. II., p.35, L.5 - p.36, L.4; p.44, 13-16.) The State later charged Mr. Garner with 
battery on, and propelling bodily fluids at. a detention deputy. I.C. §§ 18-915(2), 18-915B; 
R., pp.6-7, 34-35, 83-84. 
At trial, six detention deputies testified about the incident.3 They said that Mr. Garner 
was increasingly uncooperative as they tried to search him during intake, so they took him to a 
holding cell to complete the search. (See. e.g .. Tr. Vol. II.4 p.14. L.6 p. I 5. L.24 (testimony of 
Deputy Huffaker).) As the deputies escorted i\·1r. Garner into the holding cell, Mr. Garner 
allegedly spit at Deputy Huffaker (Tr. Vol. IL p.21. Ls.2-9, p.22. L.4 - p.23. L.5, p.25, L.23 
p.26, L.24 ). which prompted the deputies to take Mr. Garner to the ground (Tr. Vol. IL p.25, 
Ls.13-22). 
At that point, multiple deputies were trying to control Mr. Garner, who was on his 
stomach on a cement slab in the holding cell. ( Tr. Vol. II, p.28. Ls.13-14 ). Deputy Huffaker put 
Mr. Garner's legs into a figure-four leg-lock (Tr. Vol. II, p.29, Ls.1-24), Deputy Johnson helped 
Deputy Huffaker with Mr. Garner's legs (Tr. Vol. 11, p.31, Ls.5--7), Deputy McKinley was on 
2 Volume I contains the first two days of trial (October 20 and 21, 2014) and the sentencing 
hearing (December 17, 2014). 
3 The court admitted a video of the incident, which was captured by the jail's surveillance 
cameras, as State's Exhibit 1. (Tr. Vol. I, p.233, L.16 - p.236, L.3.) 
2 
Mr. Garner's upper body (Tr. Vol. II, p.30. Ls.20-24, p.73. L.11 
Burnett was trying to control Mr. Garner's (Tr. Vol. II, p.17, Ls. l 
p.74. L.8), and Deputy 
). Around that time, 
Deputy Lusby heard Mr. Gamer making ·'guttural-type noises" and say things like "I can't 
breathe," and "get your hands off me." (Tr. Vol. L p.446, Ls.8-15.) Deputy Burnett remembers 
Mr. Garner saying "[g]et off my fucking back.'" (Tr. Vol. L p.189, Ls.20-22.) Mr. Garner 
eventually kicked out of the leg lock and hit Deputy Huffaker, after which Officer Huffaker tased 
Mr. Garner. (Tr. Vol. II, p.35. L.5 p.36, L.4. p.46, L.11 -p.49. L.1.) 
At the close of the evidence, the court took up Mr. Gamer's proposed self-defense 
instruction. That instruction provides: 
An officer is not permitted to use unreasonable or excessive force [in 
making or attempting to make an arrest] [in detaining or attempting to detain a 
person for questioning]. 
If an officer does use unreasonable or excessive force [in making or 
attempting to make an arrest] [in detaining or attempting to detain a person for 
questioning], the person being [arrested] [detained] may lawfully use reasonable 
force to protect himself. 
The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: 
(1) that the officer did not usc unreasonable force. or 
(2) if the officer used unreasonable force. that the defendant used 
unreasonable force in response. 
If the state fails to do so. you must find the defendant not guilty [ of 
[Resisting][,] [Delaying] [or] [Obstructing] an Officer]. 
(R., p.76; Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction ( .. IC.JI'') 1263.) Defense counsel acknowledged that 
the instruction, \vhich he took verbatim from the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, would need to 
be modified to fit the facts of this case. (Tr. Vol. I. p.213, Ls.I 25.) 
The State objected to the proposed instruction, explaining that (1) the officers involved 
were detention officers, not peace officers or public officers as defined by statute (Tr. Vol. I, 
p.461, L.3 - p.462, L.2); (2) the altercation took place while Mr. Garner was being booked into 
jail, not while the officers attempted to arrest or detain him (Tr. Vol. I, p.460, L.12 - p.461, L.2; 
4 Volume II contains the third day of trial (October 23, 2014). 
3 
Vol. II, p.127, L.12 - p.128. L.1); (3) there was no evidence that Mr. Gamer was scared or 
the officers used against him unreasonable ( II, p. l Ls.8-15, p.1 26 
-p.127, 10,p.128, p.] I. p.130. L5); and (4) instruction \Vas 
irrelevant and would be distracting, confusing. and misleading (Tr. Vol. IL p.126, Ls.16-22, 
p.127, Ls.10-11). 5 
Mr. Gamer argued that ( 1) the right to defend oneself against excessive force is grounded 
in the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions, not in statute, and so it docs not matter whether the officers 
·were peace officers or detention officers (Tr. Vol. II, p.124, Ls.18-24, p. l L6 p.126. L.5); 
(2) that right did not evaporate after he \Vas arrested or detained (Tr. Vol. fl, p.125. Ls.2-24, 
p.131, Ls.18-23 ); (3) there was sufficient e\ idence to support the instruction, including the 
testimony that Mr. Garner said "I can't breathe" during the altercation (Tr. Vol. II, p.129, Ls.I 
22, p.130, L.21 p.131, L 1 ); and ( 4) the instruction was extremely relevant to Mr. Garner's 
defense and would not distract the jury (Tr. Vol IL p.131, Ls.2-17). 
The district court acknowledged that an officer testifo:d that Mr. Garner said "I can't 
breathe" (Tr. VoL II, p.130, Ls.6-20), but reasoned that (1) the instruction applied only to peace 
officers or public officers, not detention officers (Tr. Vol. II, p.132, Ls. I-I 7), and (2) the case 
referenced in the model jury instruction. ,\tali! v. Spurr, 114 Idaho 277, 279 (Ct. App. 1988), 
addressed only force used during arrests and detentions, not force used after a defendant was 
already in custody (Tr. Vol. II, p.132. L.1 p.134, L.12). The court explained: 
In this case the court wants to first briefly address the original comment on 
Tuesday from [the State]. In this case, although [ICJI] 1263, the one that is being 
5 The State also argued that, if the court were to give the instruction, it should instruct the jury 
that the instruction should only be considered with respect to the lesser included charge of 
resisting and obstructing, and not the battery charge. (Tr. Vol. II, p.128, L.8 - p.129, L.12.) The 
court did not reach that issue. (Tr. Vol. II, p. I 31, L.25 - p.134, L.21.) As demonstrated by the 
analysis below, however, the self-defense instruction is warranted with respect to both the 
battery and resisting and obstructing charges. 
4 
asked to be given to the jury in this case concerning the use of force, 
does not specifically use the \Vord "peace officer." 
Nonetheless, in the "Comments" second, it does refer the court or refer to 
[ICJI] I 264 where the definition of public or peace officer is contained. 
And as we had talked about previously concerning the request for the 
instruction on resisting and obstructing an officer, there is a distinction between a 
peace officer and a detention officer statutorily. 
The court would also note and it does agree with the state here that the 
Spurr case, which is cited in the comments section which the defense is relying 
on, did indeed simply involve a situation of either an attempted arrest or certainly 
an attempt to detain a defendant for questioning. 
And the cases. as l the State] has correctly noted. relied upon in the Spurr 
decision, all dealt with the use of force during an arrest. And there was no 
authority of which I \Vas aware oL appellate authority, that talks about this 
instruction being given in the case or someone being in a detention facility, 
whether in a correctional facility or a county detention or correctional facility 
there. 
The court agrees that the /-,JJWT court did indicate that a person has a 
constitutional right not to be subjected to excessive force by officers in the 
performance of their duties. But having said that, the instruction itself contains 
two alternatives for the court as to how a jury could be instructed, either that an 
officer is not permitted to use unreasonable or excessive force in making or 
attempting to make an arrest. or in detaining or attempting to detain a person for 
questioning. 
And, again, this language is consistent with the decision in Spurr, which is 
one of those situations where it was either an arrest or certainly an attempt to 
detain an individual for questioning. 
Considered as a whole, the court does not find, based upon the case 
authority, that in Spurr the appellate court intended to have the defense applied so 
broadly as to encompass individuals vd10 are in a correctional or detention 
facility. 
And, therefore, because the instruction sought in this case is applied to 
either arrests or detention for questioning and because neither one of those things 
applied in this case, I do not believe it is appropriate to give the requested 
instruction number 1263, and I will not do so then at this time. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.132, Ll p.134, L.12.) 
The jury found Mr. Garner guilty of both charges (Tr. Vol. II, p.219. L.7 p.220, L.5), 
and Mr. Gamer timely appealed (R., pp.146-48 ). 
5 
ISSUE 
district court commit reversible error rejecting Garner's self-defense 
6 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Committed Reversibk Error By Rejectinu Mr. Garner·s Proposed Self.-
Defense Instruction 
Introduction 
The district court erred when it found that an arrestee being booked into jail6 has no right 
to defend himself against a detention deputy·s use of unreasonable or excessive force. The cow1 
mistakenly limited its analysis to ICJI 1263 and Spurr, without considering defense counsel's 
argument that an individual, regardless of his status within the criminal justice system, has a 
right to be free from, and use reasonable force to defend against. an officer's use of excessive 
force. Indeed, there is no meaningful difference between a police officer's use of excessive force 
during an arrest and a detention deputy's use of force after the arrest. In either situation, the 
arrestee does not have to choose between suffering serious injury or death on the one hand, and 
earning a felony conviction and prison term on the other. The arrestee instead has a limited right 
to self-defense. He can respond to the deputy· s use of excessi\ e force with a reasonable amount 
of force. This Court should therefore hold that an arrestee has the right to de rend himself against 
excessive force during the booking process. vacate Mr. Garner·s battery con\'iction, and remand 
this case to the district court for a ne\V trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
If an error was follov,ed by a contemporaneous objection at trial. and the appellant shows 
that a violation occurred, the burden shifts to the State to prove the error was harmless beyond a 
6 Although Mr. Garner contends his status within the criminal justice system does not affect the 
outcome of this case, he refers to himself as an "arrestee" for clarity's sake. See Aldini v. 
Johnson, 609 F.3d 858,866 (6th Cir. 2010) ( .. The Court noted in dicta in Wolfish that individuals 
who have not had a probable-cause hearing are not yet pretrial detainees for constitutional 
purposes.") (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 440 U.S. 520. 536 (1979)). 
7 
reasonable doubt. State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010); see also Chapman v. California, 
u 18 (1967). This requires the to beyond a reasonable doubt, "that 
constitutional violation did not contribute to the jury's verdict.,. Perry, 150 Idaho at 
"Whether a jury has been properly instructed is a question of law O\er which this Court 
exercises free review.'· State v. Pearce. 146 Idaho 241. 247 (2008). To determine whether a 
defendant's requested instruction should have been given, the appellate court .. must examine the 
instructions that were given and the evidence that was adduced at trial." State v. Johns, 
1 12 Idaho 873, 881 (1987). This Court also exercises ·'free revie\V 0\ er the trial court's 
determination of \\hether due process standards have been satisfied.'' State i· Schevers. 
132 Idaho 786, 788 (Ct. App. 1999). 
C. The District Court Committed Reversible Error Bv Rejecting Mr. Garner's Self-Defense 
Instruction 
"A defendant is entitled to an instruction where 'there is a reasonable view of the 
evidence presented in the case that ·would support' the theory" articulated in the proposed 
instruction. Pearce, 146 Idaho at 247-48 (2008) (quoting Store v. Eastman. 122 Idaho 87. 90 
( 1992)). When a reasonable view of the evidence supports the instruction requested, the subject 
matter of the proposed instruction is not CO\ ered elsewhere in the instructions, and the proposed 
instruction does not improperly comment on the evidence the "requested instruction on 
governing law must be given:' State V. Fe!lerzr. 126 Idaho 475. 476-77 (Ct. App. 1994). "If the 
foregoing criteria are met, but the requested instruction incorrectly states the lavv, the trial court 
is ·under the affirmative duty to properly instruct the jury."' Id (quoting Eastman, 122 Idaho 87, 
91 (1992)). Erroneous instructions amount to reversible error if "the instructions as a whole 
misled the jury or prejudiced a party." State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588 (2011 ). 
8 
Mr. Garner's theory of the case regarding the battery charge was that. to the extent that he 
a battery, he selt:defense. A reasonable of the e\ idence presented at 
supports that theory. After Mr. Garner allegedly spit at one the deputies during intake, 
the deputies took Mr. Garner to the ground. (Tr. Vol. II, p.22, L.4 p.23, L 19, p.25, Ls.13-22.) 
Four deputies tried to control Mr. Garner, who was on his stomach on a cement slab with his 
hands cuffed behind his back. (Tr. Vol. II, p.28. Ls.13-14). Deputies Huffaker and Johnson held 
Mr. Garner's legs (Tr. Vol. IL p.29, Ls.1-24, p.31, Ls.5-7), Deputy Burnett was trying to control 
Mr. Gamer's head (Tr. Vol. II, p.27, Ls.19-23), and Deputy McKinley \Vas on Mr. Gamer's 
upper body (Tr. Vol. II, p.30, Ls.20-24. p.73 L.11 p.74, 1 8). (See also Tr. Vol. I, p.284, 
Ls.19-22 (Deputy Burnett ans\vering ')cs .. when asked "[s]o hands behind his back and his 
body is prone on the floor and there is [sic] at least three officers on top of him at that time, 
correct?''); Tr. Vol. II, p.73. Ls.2-5 (Deputy Huffaker testifying that Deputy Burnett was putting 
pn:ssure on l'vfr. Gamer's shoulder blades).) 
Around that time, Deputy Lusby heard \Ir. Garner making .. guttural-type noises" and say 
things like "I can't breathe ... and --get your hands off me" (Tr. Vol. 1, p.446. Ls.8-15), and 
Deputy Burnett heard Mr. Garner say "·[g]et off my fucking back'' (Tr. Vol. I, p.189, Ls.20-22). 
Mr. Garner then kicked out of the leg lock and hit Deputy Huffaker. (Tr. Vol. L p.360, Ls.10-12 
(Deputy McKinley testifying that Mr. Garner '·kicked out of [the leg lock]. And in the process of 
kicking out, he kicked [Deputy Huffaker] in the stomach and moved him back."); Tr. Vol. II., 
p.35, L.5 - p.36. L.4) (Deputy Huffaker testifying that Mr. Garner was "starting to kick out of 
the leg-lock," "was bucking his body, kind of using his upper body pushing oft~ using his legs, 
and pushing [Deputy Huffaker] with his feet.'' and kicked Deputy Huffaker).) Although the 
district court did not squarely address the issue. it appears that the court found that the testimony 
provided a factual basis for Mr. Garner's selt:Jefense instruction. (Tr. Vol. II, p.130, Ls.6-20 
9 
did recall hearing some testimony on that issue. Not much. but again, I did recall hearing at 
some testimony. 
Instead, the court to give instruction because it concluded that there 
vvas no legal basis for self-defense under these circumstances. (Tr. Vol. II, p.131, L.25 p.134, 
L.12.) Specifically, the court rejected Mr. Garner's proposed instruction because it believed a 
defendant could only assert self-defense against excessive force used by peace officers, not 
detention officers, in situations in which the officer used excessive force during an arrest, not 
after the defendant \Vas already arrested. (Tr. Vol. II. p.132. L. l p.134, L.12.) The court based 
its conclusion on ICJI 1263 and Spurr. without ever really addressing defense counsel's 
argument that the right of self-defense is grounded in the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. (Id) 
The court erred in several respects. As an initial matter. model jury instructions are not 
the lmv, and the court must modify such instructions, or create completely new instructions, in 
order to communicate the applicable law to the jury. See Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, 
Introduction and General Directions for Use 7; see also Tr. Vol. I. p.21 Ls.l-25. What's more, 
the Court never squarely addressed defense counsel's argument that the U.S. and Idaho 
Constitutions give a person the right to defend himself against a government officer's use of 
excessive force, and that right does not disappear depending on the person ·s status within the 
criminal justice system or the title of the officer using excessiw force. Because Mr. Garner had 
7 According to the Introduction and General Directions For Use: 
[T]he law prevailing during the period of drafting is reflected in the instructions. 
As the law in any respect becomes more refined or is modified by statute or 
appellate decision, the IC.JI instructions must be modified accordingly. 
In addition, judges and lawyers should note that these instructions cannot 
possibly cover all of the legal issues on which a jury may need guidance in a 
particular case .... A trial judge should remain vigilant in observing the duty set 
forth in Idaho Code § 19-2132: "In charging the jury, the court must state to 
them all matters of law necessary for their information.'' 
Id. at p. l, available at https://www.isc.idaho.gov/main/criminal-jury-instructions. 
10 
a right to use reasonable force against the deputies' use of excessive force, the district court erred 
refusing to give his proposed instruction. error Mr. constitutional right 
to present a complete defense and so the cannot pro\e that it did not contribute to the jury's 
verdict. The error requires reversal. 
I. An Arrestee Has The Right To Defend Himself Against A Detention Deputy's 
Use Of Excessive Force 
The U.S. Supreme Court and Idaho courts have long recognized an individual's right to 
defend himself against another's use of force. ,'-,ee. e.g., Beard v. United Swtes, 158 U.S. 550 
( 1895 ); State v. 1vfcGreevey, 17 Idaho 453 ( 1909). Although this right is reaffirmed in statute, 
J.C.§§ 19-201, 19-202, 19-202A8 the right undoubtedly predated the statutory right, and is 
rooted in the U.S. Constitution, the Idaho Constitution, and common law. See, e.g., Beard, 158 
U.S. at 561-64; Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846. 852 (6th Cir. 2002), ID. CONST., art. L § 1 
(''All men are by nature free and equaL and have certain inalienable rights. among which arc 
enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property; pursuing 
happiness and securing safety."). As the Sixth Circuit in Taylor v. Winthrow explained: 
The right to claim self-defense is deeply rooted in our traditions. 
Blackstone referred to self-defense as the primary law of nature, and claimed that 
it is not, neither can it be in fact, taken avvay by the lav, of society. According to 
him, the common law held self-defense an excuse for breaches of the peace, nay 
8 The Idaho Code outlines self-defense generally, without limiting the circumstances under 
which an individual can claim self-defense. --Lawful resistance to the commission of a public 
offense may be made: 1. By the party about to be injured. 2. By other parties." I.C. § 19-201. 
"Resistance sufficient to prevent the offense may be made by the party about to be injured: 1. To 
prevent an offense against his person, or his family, or some member thereof. 2. To prevent an 
illegal attempt by force to take or injure property in his lawful possession." l.C. § 19-202. "No 
person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting 
himself or his family by reasonable means necessary, or when coming to the aid of another 
whom he reasonably believes to be in imminent danger of or the victim of aggravated assault, 
robbery, rape, murder or other heinous crime." I.C. § l 9-202A. The statute governing the use 
of force to make an arrest, I.C. § 19-610, similarly does not speak to the use of force after the 
point that an arrest is made. 
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even for homicide itself. Even f-gelhoff:9 a case taking a decidedly narrow view 
of which rights are "fundamental," the Court commented that the right to have the 
jury consider self-defense evidence may be a fundamental right. We know of no 
state that either currently or the past has barred a criminal defendant from 
putting fonvard self-defense as a defense \Vhen supported by the evidence. 
Id at 852 (internal citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted; footnote added). 
In the context of arrestees, pretrial detainees, and inmates, the line between this right of 
self-defense and the corollary right to be free from a government actor's use of excessive force is 
some·what blurred. See Spurr, 114 Idaho at 279 ( .. A person has a constitutional right not to be 
subjected to excessive force by la\v enforcement officers in the performance of their duties. 
Furthermore, a defendant has a right to defend himself against the use of excessive force by an 
officer.") (internal citations omitted); United :-,'tales v. Gore, 592 F.3d 489, 491-92 (4th Cir. 
2010) (in which the government conceded that ·'[ s Jome minimal right of self-defense must be 
available to inmates charged [ with assaulting. resisting, or impeding certain officers or 
employees] under 18 U.S.C. § 111 because disabling an inmate entirely from protecting himself . 
. . would violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments."); 
see also Tr. Vol. IL p.124, L.18 125, L.18. Like 42 U.S.C. 1983 cases alleging an otlicer's 
use of excessive force, the source of the right to self-defense \Vi thin the U. Constitution mav 
vary depending on when the force is used. Crnham v. Connor. 490 U.S. 386, 388 ( l 989) (the 
Fourth Amendment applies to excessive force used during seizures), Whirley v. Al hers, 4 75 U.S. 
312, 320-21 (1986) (the Eight Amendment applies to excessive force used after conviction); 
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466. 2475-76 (2015) (approving of an excessive force 
claim brought by a pretrial detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause). 
Regardless of its origins, the right of self-defense does not evaporate if the individual 
acting in self-defense is an arrestee, detainee, or inmate. Instead, the right is modified. 
9 Jvfontana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 55-56 ( 1996) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
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Gore, 592 F.3d at 495 (holding that .. a prisoner charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. 
111 must. to succeed on affirmative self-defense, demonstrate that he responded 
to an unlawful and present threat of death or bodily injury. v. Bradley, 10 P.3d 
358, 358 (Wash. 2000), (analogizing to the arrest context to hold that an inmate "may claim self-
defense and use force to resist only when that [inmate] is in actuaL imminent danger of serious 
injury."): Com. v. F'rancis, 511 N.E.2d 38. 40 (Mass.Ct. App. 1987) ('·The right of an individual 
to defend himself is modified where a police or correction officer is involved. Even in 
circumstances vvhere the defendant would be justified in using force in lawful defense of his 
person against a third person, he may not do so against a police or correction officer unless the 
officer uses excessive or unnecessary force. State v. Bojon1uez, 675 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Ariz. 
1984) (analogizing to S'tate v. Afartinez, 596 P.2d 734 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979). which held that an 
arrestee has right to self-defense against a police officer's use of excessive force during arrest, to 
find that an inmate has the right to defend himself against a prison ofiicial"s use of excessive 
force).) 
Therefore, the court should have instructed the jury that, if the detention deputies used 
unreasonable or excessive force, Mr. Garner could use reasonable force to protect himself. 
See ICJI 1263. This instruction accurately states the law. is supported by the facts, and is not 
covered by any other instruction. (See R., pp.95-133; Tr.. Vol. II, p.148, L.14 p.160, L.10.) 
The court erred by refusing to give the self-defense instruction. 
2. The District Court's Error Violated Mr. Garner's Constitutional Right To Present 
A Complete Defense And Thus Requires Reversal 
The Sixth Amendment protects a defendant's right to present a complete defense. 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967); Cal(fornia v. Trombetta. 467 U.S. 479, 485 
(I 984); see also ID. CONST., art. I, § 13 ( .. No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or 
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property without due process of law."). necessary corollary . . is the rule that a defendant in 
trial has the right, under appropriate circumstances. to have J instructed on s 
or defense, the right to present a would be meaningless were a trial court 
completely free to ignore that defense when giving instructions.'· Taylor. 288 F.3d at 851-52. 
Further, "[a]n erroneous instruction that relieves the State of its burden to prove an element of a 
charged crime can be characterized as either a violation of due process, or as a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee." State v. Parsons, 153 Idaho 666, 669 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(internal citations omitted). When the defendant has been denied a fair opportunity to defend 
against the charge, his conviction must be overturned. 5,;tate 1·. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 676 
(Ct. App. 2003) (overruled on other grounds as recognized by State v. Ga/ran, 156 Idaho 3 79, 
383 (Ct. App. 2014)): see also Perry, 150 Idaho at 227 (the appellate court will reverse and 
remand unless the State proves '·that the constitutional violatinn did not contribute to the jury's 
verdict." ); Draper, 151 Idaho at 5 88 ( an erroneous instruction constitutes reversible error "if the 
instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party"). 
As explained above, a reasonable \ iev, of the evidence supports Mr Garner's requested 
instruction and the instruction accurately states the law. By refusing to instruct the jury 
regarding Mr. Garner's defense, the district court denied him a fair opportunity to defend against 
the battery charge. See Washington, 388 U.S. at 17-19; U.S. CONST., amend. VI; ID. CONST., 
art. I, § 13. Indeed, the court relieved the State of its burden to prove both the elements of the 
battery charge and that Mr. Garner was not acting in self-defense. See I.C §§ 18-915(2), 18-
903 (defining battery as the unlawful use of force, an unlaivful touching or striking, or 
unlawfully causing bodily harm); I CJI 1263. That error cannot be harmless. 
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CONCLUSION 
Garner respectfully requests that Court vacate his battery conviction and remand 
to the district court for a new trial. 
DATED this 24th day of September, 2015. 
'h( ~~~~ 
M:\ YA.WALDRON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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